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Legislative Success in the Arkansas General Assembly:
A Causal Perspective

Mark C. Ellickson, Southwest M issouri State University
Donald E. Whistler, University o f Central Arkansas

This study employs recursive path analysis techniques to develop a causal model of
legislative success in the “one party-no party” state legislature of Arkansas. Utilizing a unique fivestep process to measure bill-passage through the Arkansas House, four direct paths to legislative
success were identified: educational level, age, race, and seniority. The final model suggests a
legislative body in transition from amateur status and exclusivity to one more autonomous and
competitive.

Introduction
The main task of state legislatures involves passing bills into law.
Approximately 250,000 bills are introduced every biennium, and nearly
one-fifth are enacted into law (Book o f the States 1990). Recognizing the
param ount importance of the legislative function, political scientists
have long sought to identify those factors which facilitate the passage of
legislation. Identification of the determinants of legislative success is
necessary if political scientists are to understand and predict legislative
behavior and output; it is necessary for citizens who want to elect
effective representatives who can best serve their interests; and it is
necessary for legislators themselves who wish to serve their constituents
in an effective manner.
Regrettably, studies that use state legislators as units of analysis
in an attempt to integrate the diverse and disparate findings of this field
into a theory of legislative success have largely failed. Aside from
M eyer’s (1980) causal analysis of the 1973 North Carolina state legisla
ture, there have been no further attempts at model building in this area
of study. Furthermore, legislative studies that do exist have tended to 1)
emphasize bivariate statistical designs (as opposed to multivariate); 2)
examine “reputation” for influence rather than “actual” legislative
success; and 3) focus on two-party or modified one-party dominant state
legislatures.
This article seeks to address these gaps in the literature by
utilizing recursive path analysis techniques to develop a causal model of
legislative success in the “one party-no party” state legislature of Ar

Mark C. Ellickson and Donald E. Whistler

kansas.1 In addition, legislative success will be measured directly using
a relatively new method we believe to be an improvement over previous
efforts.
Literature Review and Model Development
A review of the literature on the determinants of legislative
success revealed three comprehensive categories: personal, institu
tional, and environmental.2 With respect to personal attributes, a
number of studies indicated that education, occupation, age, gender,
race, and political ideology were likely contributors to a legislator’s
success (or lack of it) in bill passage. For example, better educated
legislators should be able to communicate more clearly within the legis
lative arena, and to grasp complex issues and formulate solutions to
problems more readily than their less educated colleagues (Meyer 1980;
Rosenthal 1981,57-60; Weissert 1988; Rosenthal 1989,75-76). Legisla
tors with prestigious occupations may enjoy a higher esteem among col
leagues (Meyer 1980). Attorneys, in particular, may be advantaged
because of their training in an area (bill drafting) essential to the
legislative process (Weissert 1988).3
Legislative performance and its relationship to age is unclear.
Some argue that the relationship is curvilinear in nature (Weissert
1988). Here a legislator’s success is thought to increase with age and
then decline as energy levels decrease and issue stands become anachro
nistic. Others argue that the relationship is negative. They cite the
professionalization of state legislatures in recent decades as creating a
window of opportunity for junior members to make a “nam e” for
themselves early in their careers (Rosenthal 1981, 31, 57-59; Ellickson
and Whistler 1989,16).
Evidence regarding the impact of race and gender on legislative
success is limited and conflicting. While several studies have discerned
no significant differences in legislative success based on race or gender
(Hamm, Harmel, and Thompson 1983; Thompson and M oncrief 1990),
others have noted the dearth of women and blacks in many state houses
(Rosenthal 1981, 30-31). Because representatives of these groups are
likely to have less seniority and expertise and to hold fewer leadership
positions than white male representatives, we would expect them also to
be less successful in the legislature.
Finally, the pervasiveness of conservatism among southern state
legislators suggests that success should accrue to those holding conser
vative views (Wolfinger and Hollinger 1970; Meyer 1980).
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The literature also indicated that institutional variables may be
important determinants of legislative behavior. Serving the legislature
in a formal capacity (i.e., party leadership position and/or committee
leadership role) is evidence of legislative involvement and value to the
legislature (Best 1971; Frantzich 1979). Party leaders have access to nu
merous sources of informal power (Rosenthal 1981), and thus greater
potential for success in the legislature (Meyer 1980). Similarly, prestig
ious committee assignments can allow legislators to become leading
experts on select subjects, thereby enhancing their special status among
colleagues (Wahlke, Eulau, Buchanan, and Ferguson 1962; Smith and
D eering 1984; Sinclair 1986).
Seniority is another institutional characteristic often associated
with legislative success. In a tradition-laden institution such as the
legislature, seniority provides a rough but apt indicator of political
experience, achievement, and accumulated wisdom-all plausible con
tributors to success (Frantzich 1979; Meyer 1980; Squire 1988).
A final subset of attributes concerns the environmental con
straints within which legislators must operate. Geographic and urbanrural differences may generate political issues which enhance or detract
from a legislator’s standing in the legislature. For example, there is a
longstanding historical schism between the northwest hill region of
Arkansas and the delta lowlands (Ledbetter 1972, 16-18; Hinshaw
1986). T he pre-Civil W ar delta plantation culture supported the war,
while the non-slaveholding mountain and hill counties in northwest
Arkansas opposed it and ultimately developed into a hotbed of populism
after the war (Key 1949,5-8; Bass and DeVries 1976,88; Hinshaw 1986).
This heterogeneous mix of mountain and delta populations has resulted
in separate and distinct constituencies within the Arkansas General
Assembly (Griffin 1971, 17), although Savage and Blair (1984, 59-85)
believe that this geographic division may have lessened somewhat in
recent years.
A second environmental factor, urban-rural district representa
tion, has historically been a major source of legislative conflict (Jewell
1964; Francis 1967). Despite the reapportionment movement of the
1960s, rural power has been slow to dissipate in some southern states
(see Tickamyer 1983). Indeed, Arkansas itself has a long history of
intense urban-rural conflict in the legislature (Francis 1967,41) and has
frequently pursued the strategy of placing rural conservative Democrats
in key leadership positions to perpetuate rural influence (Saffell 1987,
122). Hence, we would anticipate rural legislators in Arkansas to be
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more effective than those from urban districts.
These factors by no means exhaust the list of attributes which
may affect a legislator’s ability to secure passage of his or her legislation.
Policy expertise, political friendship and trust, strength of local interest
groups, level of district competition, and the internal organization of a
legislature have all been cited as possible factors in any model of
legislative effectiveness (see Rosen 1974; Meyer 1980; Caldeira and
Patterson 1988; Squire 1988). Unfortunately, the arduousness of data
collection and the desirability of model parsimony require the selective
incorporation of a limited number of variables in any research project.
With respect to our dependent variable, legislative success, most
earlier studies used reputational measures based on “perceptions of in
fluence” (see Francis 1962; Best 1971; Meyer 1980). Dahl (1976) and
others have criticized the reputational approach on the grounds that
potential for influence does not necessarily result in actual success.
Consequently, more recent studies have sought to measure legislative
success directly (see Frantzich 1979; Hamm et al. 1983; Ellickson and
Whistler 1989). Here the operational focus is on a lawmaker’s ability to
convert his or her legislation into law. The assertion is made that success
is not identifiable until a legislator’s preferences on important decisions
prevail on a regular basis (Dahl 1961). In this study we will utilize the
direct measurement approach and will incorporate “reputation for
influence” as an intervening variable in our model of legislative success.
Guided by the literature on legislatures, a descriptive model il
lustrating presumed causal relationships among major variables was
constructed. As shown in Figure 1 below, personal and environmental
factors are treated as determinants of seniority, formal office, reputa
tion, and legislative success. Additionally, institutional status variables
and reputation for influence are viewed as causal forces on legislative
success.
Research Design: Setting and Measurements
The units of analysis in this study were all Democratic legislators
in the 1981 session of the Arkansas House of Representatives.4 Specific
measures regarding personal, institutional, and environmental attrib
utes are contained in Appendix A. Data regarding reputation for
influence were obtained through interviews with 84 of 100 House
members.5 The survey questionnaire included the following question:
“If you were to name four or five legislators who are most effective at getting
bills passed, whom would you name?”
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House members were ranked from highest to lowest based upon the
number of mentions given to individual representatives.
To measure our dependent variable, legislative success, we ob
served how successful a legislator was at getting his or her bills passed
through the House chamber.6 In a previous study, twenty-six legislative
maneuvers leading to bill passage in the Arkansas legislature were
identified (see Whistler and Ellickson 1988). This coding scheme was
modified by combining similar legislative maneuvers to identify the five
major legislative steps necessary for bill passage in the Arkansas H ouse
chamber (see Appendix B). Bill-passage success for each legislator was
then calculated by “scoring” each bill submitted according to the index
in Appendix B and totalling the results.7 For example, legislator A
submits six bills: two bills never make it out of committee (1 point each),
one bill is debated on the House floor, but receives no further action (2
points), one bill is defeated on the House floor (3 points), and two bills
pass the House chamber with minimal formal legislative maneuvering (5
points each). Legislator A, then, is accorded 17 points using this
procedure.8
This system of measurement rewards those legislators who sub
mit a large quantity of bills (active) and who are successful at m aneuver
ing them through the five-step process described above (productive).
Other legislators can score moderately well if they are active or produc
tive. Those who are neither active nor productive should receive low
scores under this system of evaluation.
The distribution of bills on this five-point index, displayed in
Table 1, indicated that approximately 30 percent of the bills introduced
were disposed of very early in the legislative process. Nearly 60 percent
of bills introduced into the House chamber were passed successfully,
with 36 percent doing so with little or no formal legislative maneuvering.
This rather high bill-passage success rate reflects the “politics of accom
modation” characteristic of one party-no party state legislatures (R osen
thal 1981,258-259).
Unlike previous efforts to measure legislative success directly by
examining bill activity (Olson and Nonidez 1972; Hamm et al. 1983) or
bill productivity (Francis 1962; Frantzich 1979), this approach em pha
sizes the importance of both bill activity and bill productivity in a single
measure. We believe this two-dimensional approach to be an improve
ment over current one-dimensional designs.
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Table 1. Distribution of Bills On Five-Point Index in the
Arkansas House (1981)*
Five-Point Index

1981 Legislative Session
_%

1 (Minimum legislative Success)
2
3
4
5 (Maximum legislative success)

28.8
8.0
3.3
23.7
36.2
100%

(235)
(65)
(27)
(194)
(296)
N =817

*See Appendix B for details of the index.

Meeting Assumptions and Model Estimation
Intercorrelations among the exogenous variables were exam
ined to determ ine if multicollinearity was a problem. Even though there
is no agreem ent as to what constitutes substantial correlation among
independent variables (Pedhazur 1982,232-233), the common practice
o f using bivariate correlations of .75 or higher as a benchmark (Asher
1983, 52) suggested multicollinearity was not a problem. A more
stringent test for collinearity advocated by Lewis-Beck (1980, 59-61)
involved regressing each independent variable on all remaining inde
pendent variables. In doing so, we found the largest coefficient of
multiple determination (R 2) to be .48. Thus, we were satisfied that
multicollinearity was not a problem in this study.
A n inspection o f scattergrams indicated that the relationships be
tween each variable and legislative success were approximately linear.
Several variables were recoded so that they were normally distributed,
while gender (male, female), race (black, white), and political ideology'
(liberal, conservative) were coded as dummy variables. Finally, it was
assumed that the residual “error” terms were uncorrelated and that the
causal paths involved no reciprocal causation. We recognize the perils
of the uncorrelated error term assumption.9 We also recognize the
trade-off o f reaching erroneous conclusions versus the value of achiev
ing a reasonably clear and simple model.
Analysis of the Arkansas House model proceeded in two steps.
First, based on the review of the literature and analysis of the zero-order
correlation matrix (for all variables), an initial model in the form of an
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arrow diagram was constructed. Variables with insignificant correla
tions (p > .0 5 ) to any of the endogenous variables were eliminated. Then
by applying the Simon-Blalock technique of observing where linkages
between pairs of variables had been omitted and generating predictions
concerning certain partial correlation coefficients, the model was even
tually fully trimmed (Blalock 1964, 61-94). The "final" model is repre
sented by the arrow diagrams and structural equations in Figure 2.
Figure 2. Arkansas House Model (Democrats) with Residual
Variables and Structural Equations*

( 1 ) X 5 = P5 2 X 2 + P5 3 X 3 + P5u R u
(2) X<> = P 6 5 X 5 + P6v Rv
(3) X 7 = P7 5 X 5 + P 7 6 X $ + P7w Rw
(4)

x 8

= P81 x l + p82 x 2 + p84 x 4 + p85 x 5 + p 8 z Rz

•Assumes standardized data and uncorrelated residuals.
NOTE: The double-headed arrows reflect correlations among exogenous variables and should
not be interpreted as causal arrows.
KEY:

X 1 (Education); X 2 (Age); X 3 (Delta-Hill); X 4 (Race); X 5 (Seniority); X6 (Formal
Office); X 7 (Reputation); and X 8 (Legislative Success)

Second, once the model was trimmed, recursive path analysis was
used to estimate the magnitude of the linkages between variables.10 To
obtain estimates of the main path coefficients, each endogenous vari
able was regressed on those variables that directly impinged upon it.
These path coefficients were then used to examine the underlying causal
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processes within the Arkansas House and to estimate the relative impor
tance of alternative paths of influence/effectiveness.11 The model (with
direct and indirect effects) is depicted in Figure 3.
Findings
Figure 1 had predicted that legislative success of Arkansas
House Democrats would be enhanced by the characteristics of being a
well educated white male with a prestigious occupation; by being a
representative from a rural agricultural district in the delta; by being
conservative; and by having seniority, a formal position within the
legislature, and professional respect from o n e’s colleagues. The antici
pated relationship of age to legislative success was unclear based on con
flicting evidence in the literature.
O ur findings, portrayed in Figure 3, lend only partial support to
this profile of a successful legislator. As expected, educational level and
race were important determinants of legislative success with direct
effects of B = .24 and B = .21, respectively. The impact of race was
muted somewhat by the inverse relationship between race and educa
tional level, i.e., black legislators tended to be better educated than white
legislators. Expectations with regard to the remaining personal attrib
utes of occupational prestige, gender, and political ideology were not
borne out in the analysis.
By far the most powerful direct path to legislative success in the
Arkansas House was through seniority, with its direct effect (B = .40)
nearly twice that of any other variable. In a one party-no party legisla
ture, without political parties to channel conflict, we are not surprised
to find legislative success so heavily dependent upon personal accumu
lation of years of service. Likewise, we are not surprised at the powerful
impact of seniority on formal position in the legislature (B = .64) and
reputation for effectiveness. While seniority had a slightly weaker direct
effect on “reputation” than did formal office (B = .31 vs. B = .35, re
spectively), it had a substantially greater total effect (B = .53 vs. B = .35,
respectively). These findings are similar to those reported in the Meyer
(1980) study.
Interestingly, age was a variable whose impact was felt both
directly (B = -.24) and indirectly (B = .22) via seniority. As expected,
older legislators were associated with greater years of service in the
legislature which, in turn, operated directly on legislative success. Younger
representatives, however, benefited from a direct path to legislative
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*Entries are the standardized regression or path coefficients estimated for the model. The bold lines indicate significance at the .05 level. The
double-headed arrows reflect exogenous variables and should be interpreted as causal arrows. The R2 of legislative success on all predictor vari
ables is .22.

-.20

-.29

Educational Level

.24

Figure 3. Arkansas House Model (Democrats) With Estimated Path C oefficients*
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success, yielding a net effect of approximately zero (-.02) for this vari
able.
These opposing paths to legislative success may reflect the
growing modernization of the Arkansas House, a trend characteristic of
most state legislatures in the 1980s (Dresang and Gosling 1989; Opheim
1990).12 As the exclusiveness of the “good ol’ boy” network is dimin
ished, we would anticipate a gradual shift in power from older, amateur
legislators to younger, better educated, and more professional represen
tatives. A fter all, we would not expect the demands and compensation
of full-time legislative service to be particularly attractive to older,
established businessmen, attorneys, and farmers. These individuals can
afford to absorb the minor losses of income and time that part-time
service exacts, but they would have to forego outside enterprises, and at
tendant affluence, security, and independence, in order to serve as full
time legislators. Hence, professional and quasi-professional legislatures
should hold greater attraction for younger, non-established types. We
would further speculate that as this new generation of quasi-professional legislators becomes entrenched within the leadership echelons of
the Arkansas House, the path coefficient between age and success
would become positive, i.e., older legislators more successful than younger
legislators, yielding a substantial net effect for the variable age.
A ttention should also be drawn to the absence of direct linkages
between formal office and reputation for influence, on the one hand,
and actual legislative success on the other. Undoubtedly any measure of
perceived influence is going to include certain subtleties and biases that
a straightforward measure of success should minimize or avoid. One
could view influence, for example, as the ability to prevent someone
else’s success. Hence, one could be judged influential without being
successful in bill passage. Moreover, there is some evidence to suggest
that formal legislative leaders rule and exert power by controlling the
flow of legislation as opposed to sponsoring it (Francis 1962). In any
case, these findings underscore the importance of distinguishing be
tween “reputation” and actual success, as noted by Dahl earlier.
Finally, environmental influences were not as powerful as pro
jected. The distinction between urban and rural legislators did not
materialize, as metropolitan representatives generally fared no worse
(or better) than their rural colleagues. Representatives from the delta
regions, however, were somewhat more likely to achieve seniority (and,
indirectly, formal position, reputation, and legislative success) than
legislators from the non-delta districts.
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Conclusion
Clearly power is not distributed equally in any state legislature.
Therefore, legislative output will reflect the policy proclivities and biases
of an effective subgroup, such as that identified here. Identification of
the determinants of success and their causal linkages is crucial if political
scientists and others are to understand, and ultimately predict, legisla
tive behavior and policy output. Unfortunately, there is no general
model or theory that explains and accounts for legislative success at the
state level.
Armed with insights and propositions based on previous studies
of two-party/one-party dominant state legislatures, we attempted to
construct a model of legislative success in the “one party-no party”
legislature of Arkansas using path analytic techniques. Employing a
relatively new measure of legislative success we ascertained four direct
paths to legislative success in the Arkansas House: educational level,
age, race, and seniority. That seniority exhibited the most powerful
direct path (B = .40) to legislative influence was not surprising given the
personalized style of Arkansas politics and its emphasis upon accommo
dation. The impacts of occupational prestige, political ideology and
gender on legislative success were negligible, as was that of urban-rural
differences.
Contrary to expectations, neither formal office nor reputational
influence were linked to a legislator’s success in bill passage. This finding
illuminated the danger of substituting indirect measures of legislative
success for direct measures. It also signalled a possible shift in Arkansas’
legislative environment. We noted that younger, better educated repre
sentatives had acquired bases of power in the legislature independent of
seniority and formal position. This is characteristic of legislatures in
transition from closed, hierarchical systems rooted in social camaraderie
to ones more competitive, fragmented, and independent in structure
(Opheim 1990; Book o f the States 1990).
Generalization of these findings requires comparative state
analyses incorporating legislatures with similar, as well as dissimilar,
political party configurations. Additional explanatory variables need to
be considered. For example, the effects of gubernatorial position-taking
on various bills and the impact of informal networks on legislative
success are possible avenues for future inquiry. Finally, longitudinal
research designs supported by multivariate procedures are necessary
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before any comprehensive model of success in state legislatures can be
developed.

NOTES
1Arkansas has traditionally been am ong the most one-party dom inated o f states
(Rosenthal 1981,140; Bibby, Cotter, Gibson, and Huckshorn 1990,92).
2An effective legislator is loosely defined as one who is relatively successful at
navigating his or her bills through the legislative process. A m ore exact definition is
presented later in the paper.
3W e recognize the dangers o f treating ordinal data, such as occupational
prestige, formal office, and education, as interval data. However, it has long been
recognized that ordinal data can be analyzed by techniques that formally require interval
data without any serious distortions (see for example, Bohrnstedt and Carter 1971;
Kerlinger and Pedhazur 1973). Also, the literature contains many instances o f treating
ordinal data as interval for purposes o f analysis. For example, M eyer’s (1980) causal
analysis o f the 1973 North Carolina legislature utilized this approach with respect to
education, formal office, and occupational prestige. For purposes o f comparability, we
used virtually the sam e m easurem ent techniques for these three variables in our analysis
o f the Arkansas legislature.
4Dem ocrats controlled 93 o f the 100 seats in the 1981 legislative session o f the
Arkansas H ouse.
5For a detailed discussion and analysis o f this survey see Whistler and Dunn
(1983).
6In measuring legislative effectiveness it was felt that a legislator’s “sphere o f
influence” was limited primarily to the chamber he/she resided in. Consequently, in
this study “bill passage” refers to a bill clearing the H ouse chamber and not necessarily
to one passed into law.
7See Ellickson and Whistler’s (1989) study o f the Missouri H ou se using a
similar m ethod o f measuring legislative effectiveness.
8Bills submitted by H ouse members and their passage through the five stage
process are docum ented for each legislator in the A rkansas Legislative Digest (1981). A
total o f 817 individual-sponsored bills were examined and classified using this Five-Point
Index. N o distinction was m ade between bills in terms o f their substantive importance.
9When autocorrelation is present significant tests are more likely to indicate
that a coefficient is statistically significant, when in fact it is not. Fortunately, autocorre
lation and the problems it presents are more likely to appear with time-series data than
with cross-sectional data (as is the case with this study). The only m ethod o f reducing the
possibility o f autocorrelation is to insert into the model as many explicit causal variables
as possible. Clearly this approach will ultimately result in an unwieldy theoretical model.
H ence the trade-off between erroneous conclusions and a reasonably clear and simple
model.
10Path analysis is a form o f applied multiple regression analysis that uses path
diagrams to study the presumed direct and indirect influences o f independent variables on
each other and on dependent variables. Some o f the advantages o f this technique include
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permitting the researcher to examine the causal processes underlying his/her observed
relationships as well as ascertaining the relative importance o f alternative paths o f
influence for purposes o f m odel building.
11 Path coefficients are standardized regression coefficients which reflect the
average standard deviation change in an effect (endogenous variable) associated with a
one standard deviation change in a cause (exogenous variable or preceding endogenous
variable), with all other causes o f that effect held constant. Path coefficients also allow a
comparison o f the related magnitudes o f the various coefficients within the sam e m odel
(Asher 1983,47).
12In 1971 the Eagleton Institute o f Politics at Rutgers University was com m is
sioned to study the legislative process and procedures within the Arkansas General
Assembly and to make recom m endations for reform. M ore than 80 o f the 116 recom 
mendations were adopted, resulting in extensive reorganization in 1973. See Craft (1972)
for a detailed discussion o f this study.

APPENDIX A
A.

Educational Level
1 = less than high school diploma
2 = high school diploma
3 = som e college
4 = bachelor’s degree
5 = master’s degree
6 = professional degree (e.g., Ph.D .)
B. Occupational Prestige
Occupational prestige was determined by assigning a prestige score from the
1980 census occupational ranking to each legislator’s occupation (Stevens
and Hoisington 1987).
C. Political Ideology
Political ideology was obtained from a May, 1982 survey o f the Arkansas General
Assembly m em bers by the Family and God (FL A G ) organization. T he F L A G
survey was converted into a liberal-conservative scale to obtain an average score
for each legislator.
D. The demographics o f age, race, and gender were determ ined from the biblio
graphic write-ups and photographs in the 1981 A rkansas Legislative Digest.
E. Seniority rankings for each legislator were calculated from the num ber o f terms
served reported in the 1981 Arkansas Legislative Digest.
F. Formal office was a six-point ordinal scale incorporating both party position and
com m ittee position. It assigned the following values to positions: Party Leader
or Whip = 5; C om m ittee Chair and Vice Chair simultaneously on different com 
m ittees = 4; C om m ittee Chair only = 3; two or more C om m ittee V ice Chairs =
2; C om m ittee Vice chair only = 1; and Member only = 0 (Meyer 1980, 566).
G. Urban/rural was calculated by dividing the population o f the county by its
square miles.
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H.

D egree o f deltaness for a district was determined by the extent o f its production
o f rice and soybeans (neither o f which can be raised in the highlands). Data
regarding rice and soybean production per district were obtained from USDA
publications.

APPENDIX B
The Five-Point Index
A score o f one was reported if:
1 = Bill subm itted to initial com m ittee, then withdrawn by sponsor.
1 = Bill subm itted to initial com m ittee, no further action.
1 = Bill received a “do pass” recommendation from initial com m ittee, no further
action.
1 = Bill received a “do pass” recommendation from initial com m ittee, then
withdrawn by sponsor.
1 = Bill received a “do pass as am ended” recom mendation from initial commit
tee, then withdrawn by sponsor.
1 = Bill received a “do not pass” recom mendation from initial committee, no
further action.
1 = Bill received a “do not pass” recom mendation from the com m ittee, then
withdrawn by sponsor.
1 = Bill subm itted to initial com m ittee, motion to place on calendar failed, no
further action.
1 = Bill subm itted to initial com m ittee, one or more parliamentary maneuvers
occurred, bill received a “do pass as am ended” or “do not pass” recommen
dation, no further action.
A score o f two was reported if:
2 = Floor am endm ents in the initial chamber adopted, no further action.
2 = Floor am endm ents in the initial chamber adopted, then bill sent back to
com m ittee, no further action.
2 = F lo o r am endm ents in the initial chamber adopted, then withdrawn by
sponsor.
2 = Floor am endm ents in the initial chamber adopted, then bill sent back to
com m ittee, bill received a “do pass” or “do not pass” recommendation from
the com m ittee, no further action.
A score o f three was reported if:
3 =B ill was defeated on the floor o f the H ouse.
A score o f four was reported if:
4 = Bill passed the floor o f the H ouse, but encountered “moderate to heavy”
formal legislative maneuvering along the way.
N OTE: “M oderate to heavy maneuvering” was when two or more parliamentary
maneuvers occurred.
A score o f five was reported if:
5 =B ill passed the floor o f the H ouse and encountered “little if any” formal
legislative maneuvering along the way.
NOTE: “Little maneuvering” was when one parliamentary maneuver occurred.
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